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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Elvira Arellano took sanctuary in the Adalberto
United Methodist Church in Chicago.' The thirty-one-year-old Mex-
ican national sought sanctuary to avoid deportation and possible se-
paration from her eight-year-old son, a United States citizen.2 In the
months that followed, Arellano's case spurred the inception and de-
velopment of the New Sanctuary Movement (NSM).3 The NSM has
built upon the history of the concept of sanctuary and the Sanctuary
Movement of the 1980s to help undocumented immigrants with
children who are United States citizens and promote their cause of
family unity.4 Though the NSM claims all the services it provides
are legal, doubt exists regarding their claim that they are not breaking
the law when harboring illegal immigrants and providing them aid.5
One form of assistance the NSM provides is legal aid.6 The
church leader providing Arellano and her son sanctuary, Reverend
' Illegal Immigrant Deported after Leaving Church. MSNBC (Aug. 20. 2007, 12:54 PM).
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20284646/ns/us-news-life/t/illegal-immigrant-deported-
after-leaving-church/#.Tp7uWE-kAgs.
2 id
The Convening, NEW SANCTUARY MOVEMENT,
http://www.newsanctuarymovement.org/the-convening.htm (last visited September 26,
2010).
4 Building on a Powerful Tradition, NEW SANCTUARY MOVEMENT,
http://www.newsanctuarymovement.org/build-tradition.htm (last visited September 26,
2010).
Kara L. Wild, The New Sanctuary Movement: When Moral Mission Means Breaking the
Law, and the Consequences for Churches and Illegal Immigrants. 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
981, 999 (2010).
6 An Invitation to Join the New Sanctuary Movement, NEW SANCTUARY MOVEMENT,
http://www.newsanctuarymovement.org./invitation.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
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Walter L. Coleman, represented Arellano's son Saul in court.7 Saul
sued to have his mother's removal order declared null and void; he
claimed the removal order violated his constitutional rights as a citi-
zen and constituted de facto deportation.8 Though Saul's claim was
unsuccessful in court, it established a new type of claim for the citi-
zen children of illegal immigrants and a new method for the NSM to
advance their cause of family unity.9 Claims of de facto deportation
could change whether removal orders of aliens with citizen children
are constitutional. 10
This comment will give an overview of past and present
sanctuary movements, the legal strategies they have formulated to de-
fend those whom they shelter, and their impact on immigration law
and policy. Then it will examine the particular strategy of de facto
deportation-the NSM's legal strategy of choice-to understand
what is necessary to establish the claim, and whether it could nullify
an alien parent's removal order. Next, it will analyze two legal prin-
ciples underlying de facto deportation claims: the right of a child to
be raised by his parents and the right of a citizen child to reside in the
United States, to determine whether current court opinions have accu-
rately dealt with the legal and practical realities of these interests.
Finally, this comment will conclude with and analysis of how current
political trends will affect the future of the NSM and claims of de
facto deportation.
II. HISTORY OF THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
A. The Sanctuary Movement
The Sanctuary Movement defined itself as a coalition of reli-
gious organizations driven by a moral imperative to protect immi-
grants from unjust treatment by the United States government.11 The
Sanctuary Movement began in response to the 1980 Refugee Act.12
7 Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759 (N.D. 111. 2006).
8Id.
9 See Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 768-69: cf, Jessie M. Mahr. Protecting our Vulnerable
Citizens: Birthright Citizenship and the Call For Recognition of Constructive Deportation,
32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 723, 730 (2008).
10 Cf Mahr, supra note 9, at 730.
' Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a "Sanctuary"?. 61 SMU L. REv. 133, 140 (2008).
12 Id. at 139-40.
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The Refugee Act allowed for the granting of asylum to refugees who
met the statutory requirements.13 The Act defines a "refugee" as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality . . . and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail him-
self or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race. religion, nationality.
membership in a particular social group. or political opinion ... . 14
After the passage of the Refugee Act in the 1980s, thousands of refu-
gees came to the United States from El Salvador and Guatemala to
apply for political asylum, fleeing violence and political oppression. 15
In Guatemala, a civil war resulted in the death of 50,000 people and
the disappearance of 100,000 more. 16 In El Salvador, the military ex-
ecuted over 10,000 people.17 Though the refugees from Central
America met the statutory requirements for asylum, their applications
were routinely denied. 18While 5,500 Salvadorians applied for asy-
lum, only two were approved.19 From the passage of the Refugee Act
in 1980 to 1986, only three percent of Central American refugees
seeking political asylum were approved.20 For some refugees, the
denial of political asylum was a death sentence.2 1 A study by the
American Civil Liberties Union found that 130 of the Salvadorians
who were denied political asylum and deported to El Salvador were
tortured, killed, or disappeared. 22
This routine denial of Central Americans' asylum claims led
the formation of the Sanctuary Movement.23 The Sanctuary Move-
ment had two goals: to change the immigration status of the Salvado-
rian and Guatemalan immigrants to "extended voluntary departure;"
and to bring peace and economic justice to the El Salvador and Gua-
temala regions. 24 Members of the Sanctuary Movement made com-
Id. at 139; see generally Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-59 (2000)).
14 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (2000).
15 Villazor, supra note 11, at 139.
16 Michael J. McConnell, Sanctuary Movement - Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America, JRANK.ORG,
http://www.jrank.org/cultures/pages/4415 /Sanctuary-Movement.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2010).
17 Id.
" See id.
19 Id.
20 Id
21 See id.
22 McConnell, supra note 16.
23 See id.
24 Wild, supra note 5. at 987.
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mitments to extending sanctuary and opposing the United States' "il-
legal and immoral" policies in public statements.25 But the motiva-
tion behind these commitments varied: some members were dedicat-
ed to sanctuary as a moral imperative, while others focused on
sanctuary as a method of political change. 26
These distinct motivations resulted in different strategies of
assisting immigrants by members of the Sanctuary Movement.27
Most provided food, shelter, clothing and medical assistance, but
some members smuggled refugees across the border and hid them
from authorities in what was known as "evasion services."28 Mem-
bers of the Sanctuary Movement disagreed on whether their actions
were legal. 29 Some argued providing sanctuary was legal humanita-
rian assistance. 30 Others believed it was form of civil disobedience to
draw attention to the plight of Salvadorian and Guatemalan immi-
grants. 3 1
B. Responses to the Sanctuary Movement
Ultimately, the Sanctuary Movement's means resulted in the
federal prosecution of its members.32 In 1984, authorities arrested
sixty members of the Sanctuary Movement on federal charges of
smuggling, transporting, and concealing illegal aliens.33 In United
States v. Aguilar, sixteen members of the Sanctuary Movement pre-
sented a mistake-of-law defense regarding the 1980 Refugee Act.34
The defendants claimed they did not know the immigrants they were
assisting were illegal under the 1980 Refugee Act. 3 Essentially, the
defendants tried to claim that according to their interpretation of the
1980 Refugee Act, the immigrants were legally in the United States
and, therefore, they did not know they were breaking the law when
25 Id
26 Id
27 Wild, supra note 5, at 987.
28 See id.29 Id. at 988.
30 Id. at 988.
" Id. at 987-88.
32 Wild, supra note 5. at 988.
31 Id at 989.
34 Id See also United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 1989) cert denied 111
S.Ct. 751 (1991).
35 Id; see also Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Bambino, Harboring, Sanctuary, and the Crime
of Charity under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 119. 138-39, 138
n.98 (1993).
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they assisted them.36 However, the trial court did not allow this de-
fense, and the Ninth Circuit later upheld this ruling because, "a mis-
take about the applicability of the Refugee Act of 1980 to the asylum
claims of an alien is a mistake of law for which ignorance is no
excuse."
Additionally, the defendants in Aguilar claimed the Free Ex-
ercise Clause protected their actions because they believed they had a
religious imperative to provide sanctuary.3 The court rejected this
defense as well.3 The defendants also claimed a "necessity de-
fense."40 The sanctuary workers stated the routine denial of Central
Americans' claims for asylum left them with no other option but to
harbor the refugees to save their lives. 4' The court rejected this de-
fense, finding that defendants failed to prove there were no other le-
gal alternatives available to them.42 Ironically, the Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) later admitted in a court settlement "the
federal government had systematically discriminated against Salva-
doran and Guatemalan asylum applicants, thereby making the legal
process useless for the vast majority of them."43
The only defense the court considered was the claim that the
statute's harboring provisions were not meant to criminalize the har-
boring of illegal aliens, unless there was a specific intent to conceal
them from immigration authorities.44 But the Ninth Circuit found the
defendants had acted with criminal intent to conceal the illegal immi-
grants from detection by the INS, rendering this defense unsuccessful
as well.45 Eight members of the Sanctuary Movement were con-
victed, six for smuggling and two for concealing, harboring, or trans-
porting illegal aliens.46
36 Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 671.
Loken & Bambino, supra note 35, at 140. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 667.
Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 694. See also, U.S. CONST. amend. I.
39 Id. at 695.
40 Id. at 690. See also Loken & Bambino, supra note 35. at 139.
41 Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 690.
42 Id. at 693. See also Loken & Bambino, supra note 35, at 140.
43 Loken & Bambino, supra note 35, at 140.
44 Wild, supra note 5, at 990. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 689-90, Loken & Bambino, supra
note 35, at 140-41.
45 Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 690. See Loken & Bambino, supra note 35, at 141.
46 Wild, supra note 5, at 990: see Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 666-67 n.1.
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Despite the prosecution of its members, the Sanctuary Move-
ment achieved success during the 1990s as the United States made
changes to immigration policies; particularly the grant of special ref-
ugee status to Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees. 47 However, the
government also lowered the mens rea threshold for harboring illegal
aliens, tightening the grip of its policies.48 Where previously the fe-
lony standard was "willingly and knowingly" harboring illegal immi-
grants, it became a felony to merely act in "knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact" of the immigrant's status. 49
III. THE NEW SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
A. The Beginning of the New Sanctuary Movement
Arellano's case instigated the formation of the New Sanctuary
Movement (NSM) in August 2006.50 Arellano came to the United
States in 1997 and moved to Oregon where she met Saul's father.51
She gave birth to Saul in December of 1998, and two years later
moved to Chicago, where she found employment as a housekeeper at
O'Hare International Airport.52 Authorities arrested Arellano at the
airport in 2002 during a security sweep. 53 She was convicted of vi-
olating two immigration laws: crossing the border illegally in 1997,
and working under a false Social Security number in 2002.54 As the
result of her conviction, she was scheduled for deportation in August
2006.55
Arellano sought sanctuary in the Chicago church because she
feared deportation would separate her from her son.5 6 Saul's father
never acknowledged his son, and his whereabouts were unknown in
2006, making Arellano Saul's only family in the United States.67 If
47 Wild, supra note 5, at 990.
48 Id. at 990-91.
49 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006): Wild, supra note 5. at 991. See also Loken & Bambino. supra
note 35. at 162-63.
'o Wild, supra note 5. at 995 96.
" Coleman v. United States. 454 F. Supp. 2d 757.760 (N.D. 111. 2006).
52 Id
53 Id
54 Id
55 Id
56 Illegal Immigrant Deported, supra note 1.
57 Coleman v. United States. 454 F. Supp. 2d 757.760 (N.D. 111. 2006).
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Arellano were deported to Mexico, she would face either leaving her
son alone in the United States or taking him to Mexico with her. 58
Reverend Coleman provided sanctuary for Arellano and her
son, becoming the first to do so in the NSM.69 Like its predecessor,
the NSM defines itself as a coalition of religious organizations pro-
tecting immigrants from immoral treatment by the United States gov-
ernment.6 0 The primary motivation of the NSM is protection against
an assault on family unity.61 NSM has four criteria that immigrant
family members must meet to be eligible for the organization's ser-
vices. First, they must be under an order of deportation and still en-
gaging in the legal process. Secondly, they must have American citi-
zen children, and third, they have a good work record. Finally, they
must have a viable case under current law.62 Arellano became the
first case for the NSM and set the standard for all other cases it would
accept.63
B. Legal Justification of the New Sanctuary Movement
Members of the NSM provide the families with a place to live,
material support, spiritual support, and legal assistance.64 But the le-
gality of these services is questionable.65 Unlike the previous Sanct-
uary Movement, the NSM insists that all of its methods are legal.66
According to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA):
"[A] person is guilty of a felony who with knowing or in reckless dis-
regard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered or remains in the
U.S. in violation of law conceals, harbors or shields from detection or
5 Boy Fighting Mom's Battle to Stay in U.S., CBS NEWS (Jul. 2. 2010).
http://cbs.news.com/stories/2006/11/14/world/main2l8 1120.shtml.
5 Churches Providing Sanctuary for Illegal Immigrants, PBS (June 18, 2007),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/social issues/jan-jun07/sanctuary 06-18.html.
6 0 See Prophetic Hospitality: Strategy for a New Movement, NEW SANCTUARY MOVEMENT,
http://www.newsanctuarymovement.org/hospitality.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
61 Id.
62 Id.
6, Cf Celeste Kennel-Shank. Living in God's House, SOJOURNERS (Sept. & Oct. 2007),
available at
http://www.sojo.net./index.cfm?action=magazine.articles&issues=soj0709&article=07091 Oa
64 Prophetic Hospitality: Strategy for a New Movement, supra note 60.
65 Id.
66 See Legal Help & Support, NEW SANCTUARY MOVEMENT.
http://www.newsanctuarymovement.org/legal.htm (last visited September 11. 2011).
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attempts to conceal, harbor or shield from detection, such alien in any
place . . . ."67
Harboring is defined as, "the act of affording lodging, shelter
or refuge to a person, esp. a criminal or illegal alien."68 By providing
illegal immigrants a place to live, the NSM is harboring illegal
aliens.69 It is also evident that the members are acting with "knowing
or in reckless disregard" of the immigrants' illegal statuses because
they are aware of their illegal statuses when they provide them sup-
port. o Therefore, the NSM is acting illegally when it provides sanct-
uary to illegal immigrants.71
NSM argues that it is not violating the law because the con-
gregations sheltering illegal immigrants are not concealing the immi-
grants from detection.72 According to the NSM, all cases decided
under the statute "involve defendants who simply kept silent about
the aliens' presence, rather than individuals who have reported the
aliens' presence to the INS but who have continued to shelter
them."73 This defense specifically relies on the holding in Aguilar
that the harboring provisions of the statute were not meant to crimi-
nalize harboring illegal aliens, unless there was a specific intent to
conceal them from immigration authorities. 74 But it is unlikely this
defense would be successful in a prosecution of NSM members. 7
One of the defendants in Aguilar, Father Anthony Clark, was con-
victed of harboring an illegal alien for giving a seventeen-year-old
boy food and a place to stay, even though he knew the boy was an il-
legal immigrant.76 Although Clark acted with humanitarian motives
and did not actively conceal the boy, he was still found guilty.7 Un-
der Aguilar, even if members of the NSM are not actively concealing
the identities of illegal immigrants, as long as they provide shelter
6 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)(2006).
68 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (9th ed. 2009).
69 Id. ; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
70 Wild, supra note 5. at 1004.
71 Id; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)(2006).
72 See Legal Help & Support, supra note 66.
73 id
74 Cf Wild, supra note 5, at 990.
75 Infra note 77.
76 Loken & Bambino. supra note 35, at 124 25.
77 See id.
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and aid they can be charged and convicted of a felony under the
INA,78
NSM also relies on the Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Act of 2006.79 Title II, 274(3)(b) of this Act exempts individuals or
organizations that provide an illegal immigrant with "humanitarian
assistance, including medical care, housing, counseling, victim ser-
vices, and food, or to transport the alien to a location where such as-
sistance can be rendered."80 However, the Comprehensive Immigra-
tion Reform Act of 2006 never became law, so it would not provide a
successful defense if members of the NSM were ever charged with
crimes.81 Other defenses based on the humanitarian motives or reli-
gious imperatives of providing sanctuary are also unlikely to be suc-
cessful because they were not successful when argued in Aguilar.82
Thus, despite the humanitarian motives and the attempt at legal justi-
fication, members of the NSM are acting unlawfully when providing
sanctuary to illegal immigrants and could face prosecution for the fe-
lony of harboring an illegal alien under the INA.83
IV. CAPACITY, STANDING AND JURISDICTION IN CLAIMS OF DE FACTO
DEPORTATION
Elvira Arellano's case is the first NSM attempt to challenge
the deportation of an illegal immigrant with a U.S. citizen child, and
is a new approach to the claim of de facto deportation.84 Immigrant
parents under removal orders had brought previous claims of de facto
deportation by on behalf of their children, who would have suffered
constructively deportation because of the execution of the order. 85
Effectively, the NSM created a new legal strategy for citizen children
to nullify the deportation orders of their alien parents.86
78 Id. at 125-26; see Wild, supra note 5, at 988.
79 See generally Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. §
274 (3)(b)(2006).
80 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S.2611, 10 9th Cong. §274(3)(b)(2006).
8' S. 2611: 109th Congress: Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of2006.,
GovTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill-s109-2611 (last visited Sep-
tember 26, 2010).
82 Wild, supra note 5, at 1005-6.
83 Id.
84 Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
85 See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.2d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 2003); Salameda v. I.N.S., 70 F.3d
447, 451 (7th Cir. 1995).
86 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. at 759: Ofroji, 354 F.2d at 615: Salameda, 70 F.3d at 451.
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Reverend Coleman, who provided sanctuary for Arellano and
her son, brought a claim as Saul's next friend.87 Coleman sued in
federal court for a judgment declaring that the deportation of Arella-
no is, as a matter of law, a de facto deportation of her son in violation
of his constitutional rights as a citizen of the United States.8 To
avoid dismissal, Coleman had to prove that Coleman had capacity to
sue on behalf of Saul; that Saul had standing to negate his mother's
removal order; and that federal district courts had subject matter ju-
risdiction to adjudicate claims of de facto deportation.89
A. Capacity of a NSM Member to Bring a Claim on Behalf of a Minor
Citizen Child Challenging an Immigrant Parent's Removal Order
Coleman's capacity was essential to the potential success of
Saul's defacto deportation claim and of future claims by the NSM.90
If Coleman could bring a claim to challenge the deportation order of
an illegal immigrant on behalf of the immigrant's citizen child, other
members of the NSM could do so as well.91
A minor child who does not have a guardian may be
represented by a next friend, as Coleman did in this case, to sue or
defend on the minor's behalf.92 To serve as a next friend, three crite-
ria must be met: "the next friend must (1) provide an adequate expla-
nation as to why the real parties in interest ... cannot bring the suit
themselves, (2) be dedicated to minors' best interests, and (3) have
some significant relationship with the minors."93 The latter two con-
ditions are easily satisfied: Coleman provided housing, material sup-
port, and spiritual support for Saul and his mother, demonstrating his
dedication to the minor's interests and his relationship to the minor.94
The first condition, however, posed a more difficult question: why
did Arellano not bring the claim on Saul's behalf as his guardian?
It is most likely that this was a strategic move to separate the
legal interests of the parent from the legal interests of the child. In
8 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. at 759.
8' Id. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "next friend" as "A
person who appears in a lawsuit to act for the benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff,
but who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not appointed as a guardian")
89 Id. at 759 n. 1, 762-63, 766.
90 See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2).
91 See id.
92 Id
93 T.W. v. Brophy, 954 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990)).
94 Illegal Immigrant Deported, supra note 1.
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briefs, Coleman alleged that courts denied previous claims by citizen
children to stay removals of alien parents because the parents brought
the claims.95 Coleman represented only Saul's legal interests. This
provided an opportunity for the court to determine whether the re-
moval order of Saul's mother constituted his de facto deportation, vi-
olating his constitutional right as a citizen to remain in the United
States, without addressing the effect of the removal order on Arella-
no.96 So, the Coleman meets the next friend criteria.97
B. Standing of a Citizen Child to Bring a Claim Challenging an Immigrant
Parent's Removal Order
Because Coleman brought the claim on Saul's behalf, Saul
had to establish standing to challenge his mother's removal order.98
The defendants argued that Coleman "[could not] assert any claim or
controversy against any of the federal defendants, as he is not the
subject of any proceeding before the federal defendants, nor is he the
subject of the removal order."99 The court rejected the defendant's
arguments and determined a citizen child does have standing to bring
a claim challenging the removal order of his parent. 100
Saul meets the three traditional requirements of standing, al-
lowing him to assert a valid claim. 101 First, he would have suffered
an injury-in-fact if the order of removal were executed against his
mother, because he would have been forced to choose whether he
will leave the United States with his mother or remain in the United
States without her.102 That is a concrete, actual, and imminent hann.
'Pl.'s Reply to the Def.s' Mot. to Dismiss. 2, July 19. 2006.
96 Id.
97 Coleman v. United States. 454 F. Supp . 2d 757,759 n.1 (N.D. 111. 2006); see Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 163.
98 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
99 Def.s' Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss. 5, Sept. 20, 2006.
100 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
101 Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. 555. 560-61 (1992)) (noting the three requirements of stand-
ing as
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or im-
minent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fair-
ly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court. Third. it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.).
102 Id. at 764.
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The court also determined that although Saul was not the subject of
the removal order or any proceeding before the defendants, he did
have standing to bring the claim because his injury was unique from
his mother's injurV.103 His mother's iijury was forced removal from
the United States, while Saul's injury was the decision he would face
because of his mother's removal. 104 Second, there was a causal con-
nection between the injury and the conduct of the defendants. 105 If
the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement executed
the removal order, it would have caused Saul's injury. 1o Finally, a
favorable decision would redress the injury. 107 If the court voided the
removal order of Arellano, he would not have to choose between
leaving his country and leaving his mother.08 Therefore, a citizen
child like Saul had standing to bring a de facto deportation claim
challenging an immigrant parent's removal order. 109
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts to Adjudicate
Claims of De Facto Deportation
In addition to challenging Saul's standing to bring a claim of
de facto deportation, the defendants also challenged the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate the claim.110 The defen-
dants argued that Saul was bringing a claim on behalf of his mother,
an alien, and the court lacked jurisdiction.111 According to 8 U.S.C.
1252(g), "no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim
by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or ex-
ecute removal orders against any alien under this chapter."112 How-
ever, the court did not accept the defense's challenge to subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because Saul, a U.S. citizen, brought the claim.113 Of
course, if Saul's claim had been successful, the court would have de-
clared the removal order void, constituting an adjudication of Arella-
103 Id.
104 id.
'os Id. at 764.
06 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 764, n.4, 5.
107 Id. at 764-65.
108 Id. at 763-64, 764 n.4.
109 Id. at 765.
110 Id.
1 Def.s' Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss. at 5.
112 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006).
''3 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
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no's case. 114 However, the court stated that if it nullified the removal
order based on Saul's claim, the court was only granting Saul's re-
quested remedy, even if it is an "incidental benefit" to Arellano. 115
The court concluded it had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
Saul's claim and the power to grant him the remedy he sought.116
V. DE FACTO DEPORTATION CLAIMS BY CITIZEN CHILDREN CHALLENGING
THE REMOVAL ORDERS OF ALIEN PARENTS
The Coleman court established that members of the NSM
may have capacity to bring a claim of de facto deportation on behalf
of a minor citizen child challenging an immigrant parent's removal
order and to do so has the advantage of separating the child's legal
interests from the interests of the parent. 117 It also established that a
citizen child like Saul might have standing to bring a de facto depor-
tation claim challenging an immigrant parent's removal order and
federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate de
facto deportation claims.118 The final issues remaining are the ele-
ments of a de facto deportation claim and whether such a claim can
successfully nullify an immigrant parent's removal order.
A. Early Claims of De Facto Deportation
De facto deportation, also known as constructive deportation,
occurs when an alien minor's parent is deported, causing the minor to
be effectively deported if he feels he must accompany his parent. 119
The principal case of de facto deportation is Salameda v. INS., in
which the Seventh Circuit concluded the de facto deportation of an
immigrant minor child who had lived his entire life in the United
States constituted an extreme hardship, and accordingly vacated the
deportation order against his parents. 120
114 Id.
115 Id. at 765-66 (stating "Saul has a cognizable injury that the Court can redress, even if the
sought-after relief would have the incidental benefit of nullifying a removal order ... and
even if the Court would not have jurisdiction to grant that relief if Ms. Arellano had brought
a claim in her own right").
1 Id. at 765-66.
117 Id. at 762-65.
118 Id.
119 Amanda Colvin, Birthright Citizenship in the United States: Realities of De Facto Depor-
tation and International Comparisons Toward Proposing a Solution, 53 ST. Louis L.J. 219,
220 21, 226-27 (Fall 2008).
120 Salameda v. I.N.S., 70 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Daniel Salameda and his wife came to the United States from
the Philippines in 1982 with their two-year-old son, Lancelot.12 Af-
ter Salameda's student visa expired, he attempted, unsuccessfully, to
renew it, and deportation proceedings began against him and his
wife.122 The case dragged through the courts until 1991, when Sala-
meda requested suspension of the deportation order under section
244(a)(1) of the INA.123 8. C.F.R. 1240.65 states that an alien must
prove that he has been physically present in the United States for at
least seven years. 124 He must prove during that time that he was a
person of good moral character and that his deportation would "result
in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who
is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence."125
The court conceded the Salameda family would experience
hardship because of the deportation order. 126 By the time the case
reached the Court of Appeals in 1995, Lancelot was fifteen-years-old
and had lived most of his life in the United States.127 Salameda and
his wife had also had a second child, a United States citizen, who was
seven years old.128 Because Lancelot was not named in the deporta-
tion order and was not a United States citizen, the court considered
whether he would be constructively deported by the removal of their
parents and whether that constituted an "extreme hardship" sufficient
to stay the removal order. 129
One element of hardship the court considered was Lancelot's
American upbringing. 130 The court found Lancelot could not even
speak the language of his native country and if he were deported as
the result of his parent's removal then it was unlikely he would be
able to adjust to Philippine society.131 Although the INS had not con-
sidered the hardship of Lancelot's defacto deportation in their initial
decision to deport the Salamedas, the Board of Immigration Appeals
121 Id. at 448.
1 22 id.
123 id.
124 8 C.F.R. 1240.65 (2011).
125 id.
126 Salameda, 70 F.3d at 449.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 451.
30 Id.
Salameda. 70 F.3d at 451.
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found it compelling.132 The court concluded that the government
"failed to offer a rational justification for its order denying the Sala-
medas' application for suspension of deportation" and vacated the
removal order.133 The holding in Salameda means the de facto depor-
tation of an immigrant child who had been raised in the United States
can be a sufficiently extreme hardship to permit suspension of his
immigrant parents' removal order. 134
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Salameda in Oforji v. Ash-
croft, in which Doris Oforji appealed the denial of her claim for asy-
lum and order of removal.135 Oforji, a Nigerian citizen, was arrested
in 1996 and accused of being an alien seeking to procure entry in the
United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation and being an alien
not in possession of a valid immigration document.136 She claimed
she was seeking asylum to escape political persecution in her native
country and to keep her two daughters, who were United States citi-
zens, from being forced to return to Nigeria with her where they
would be forced to undergo female genital mutilation, which the
United States considers torture. 137 She testified that her children had
no other family in the United States and that her deportation would
force them to follow her to Nigeria if she were deported. 138
The Immigration Court denied her claim for asylum and
found her guilty of being an alien not in possession of a valid immi-
gration document.139 Oforji appealed on behalf of her daughters, bas-
ing her claim on "derivative asylum," a term used interchangeably
with constructive deportation.140 She presented the holding in Sala-
meda as precedent for her claim, but the court distinguished her case
from Salameda.141 The court focused on the fact that while Lancelot
in the Salameda case was an immigrant, Oforj i's children were Unit-
ed States citizens and therefore had the option of remaining in the
United States even if she were deported.142 Although Oforji said she
was her children's only family in the United States, the court stated
132 See id
' Id. at 452.
134id.
Oforji v. Ashcroft. 354 F. 3d 609. 611 (7th Cir. 2003).
136 Id
137 Id. at 612.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Oforji, 354 F.3d at 614.
141 Id. at 615.
142 id.
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that a guardian could be appointed if the girls remained in the United
States without her.143 The Court also determined that the "exception-
al hardship" applied in Nwaokolo v. I.N.S., did not apply to her be-
cause she had not entered the United States legally and had not re-
sided in the United States for the continuous seven-year period re-
required by the statute. 144 The Court held:
Undoubtedly, any separation of a child from its mother is a hardship. However,
the question before us is whether this potential hardship to citizen children aris-
ing from the mother's deportation should allow an otherwise unqualified moth-
er to append the children's right to remain in the United States. The answer is
no . . . . The law is clear citizen family members of illegal aliens have no cog-
nizable interest in preventing an alien's exclusion and deportation. 145
These two cases establish three fundamental rules of de facto
deportation claims. First, an immigrant child who will be construc-
tively deported by the execution of a removal order against his par-
ents may have the order vacated by proving extreme hardship result-
ing from the de facto deportation. 146 Second, an immigrant parent
under an order of removal cannot have the order vacated by claiming
the extreme hardship U.S. citizen child would suffer as the result of
constructive deportation, because the child does not have to leave the
United States.147 Finally, a citizen child does not have a legal interest
in preventing the deportation of his parent. 148
B. De Facto Deportation in Coleman v. United States
Saul's claim in Coleman v. United States differs in many
ways from previous claims of de facto deportation. 149 Most notably,
Saul brought the claim and not his mother, the subject of the order of
deportation.150 In Salameda, the court considered the extreme hard-
ship to an immigrant child being constructively deported as the result
of his immigrant parents' removal order.151 In Oforji, the court held
an immigrant parent could not bring a claim to nullify the removal
order based on the extreme hardship that would result from the de
143 id.
144 Id.: contra Nwaokolo v. I.N.S., 314 F.3d 303, 304 (7th Cir. 2002).
145 Oforji. 354 F.3d at 617 18.
146 Id. at 617.
147 Id. at 618.
148 Id.
149 Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
Id.
151 Salameda v. I.N.S., 70 F.3d 447, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1995).
SANCTUARY FROM DE FACTO DEPORTATION
facto deportation of her citizen children.152 In contrast, in Saul's case,
the court was not adjudicating his mother's removal order.153 He was
not challenging the removal order, but rather, challenging de facto
deportation itself as an unconstitutional violation of his rights as an
American citizen. 154
After establishing that Saul had standing to bring the claim
and the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, the court
considered whether the deportation of Saul's mother constituted de
facto deportation and whether it was a violation of his constitutional
rights as a United States citizen. 155 As a birthright citizen, Saul pos-
sessed the right to reside in the United States and an inherent right
not to be deported.156 However, as the court established in Oforji,
Saul's right to not to be deported did not confer the same right upon
his mother.157 The Court also reiterated Oforji's holding that citizen
children do not have a legally recognized interest in preventing their
parents' deportation.158 Still, that did not necessarily undermine
Saul's claim because he was not attempting to nullify his mother's
deportation order by claiming her right to remain in the United
States; he was only claiming his own right to remain in the United
States. 159
Despite the distinction, the court found no violation of Saul's
constitutional right to reside in the United States because he could
remain in the United States even if his mother was deported.160 Fur-
thermore, even if he did follow his mother to Mexico after her re-
moval, he would retain the right to return to the United States at any
time.161 Because the removal of his mother did not compel Saul to
leave the United States or deny him his constitutional right to reside
in the United States, it did not violate his constitutional rights and did
not constitute de facto deportation.162 After the denial of Saul's
152 Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618.
. Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
154id
151 Id. at 765-68
56 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
157 Id. at 767.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 760.
160 Id. at 767-68.
161 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 767-68.
162 Id. at 768-69.
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claim, Arellano was arrested and deported.163 Saul remained in the
United States with Coleman and Coleman's family. 164
C. The Right of a Child to Be Raised by His Parents
There are several fundamental flaws with the Court's reason-
ing in Coleman. First is the contention, originally asserted in Oforji,
that citizen children do not have a cognizable interest in preventing
the deportation of their immigrant parents. 165 This principle ignores
the reality that children have an interest in being raised by their par-
ents. 166
The right of a child to be raised by his parents is an interna-
tionally recognized principle. 167 The United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child states in Article 9, "Parties shall ensure that a
child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will,
except when competent authorities subject to judicial review deter-
mine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such
separation is necessary for the best interests of the child."168 One
hundred and ninety-three parties have signed the Convention, interna-
tionally recognizing that a child has an interest in being raised by his
parents, absent mitigating circumstances such as abuse or neglect. 169
The United States has signed the convention, but is one of only two
countries that have failed to ratify it; 170 thus, the Convention does not
legally grant a citizen child the right to be raised by his parents in the
United States.171 Though it is not mandatory authority, by signing the
Convention the U.S. has recognized the moral principle that a child
has an interest in familial support and care.
The concept of a child's interest in being raised by his parents
also has a basis in the American legal tradition.172 As the doctrine of
163 Illegal Immigrant Deported, supra note 1.
164 Id.
165 Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F. 3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003).
166 Colvin, supra note 119, at 229.
167 Id at 228.
168 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 9 Sept. 2, 1990,1577 U.N.T.S.
3.
169 Convention on the Rights of the Child: Status of Ratification, Declarations and Reserva-
tions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-
S1&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
170 Id.
171 See Colvin. supra note 119, at 229.
172 Id.
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Substantive Due Process developed over the Twentieth Century,
many legal decisions have insisted that the fundamental right to par-
ent children implicit in the U.S. Constitution and inherent within the
American system of government.17 3 In U.S. courts, the relationship
between a parent and child "has always been recognized as inherent,
natural right, for the protection of which, just as much for the protec-
tion of the rights of the individual to life, liberty, and pursuit of hap-
piness, our government was formed."174
Most Supreme Court decisions about familial rights have fo-
cused on the fundamental right of a parent to raise his child. 175 These
decisions also imply that it is in the child's best interest for him to be
raised by his parents.176 In Palmore v. Sidoti, a father sought sole
custody of his daughter because her mother had married a man of a
different race. 177 Though there were no findings that the mother was
in any way unfit to parent, the trial court held it was in the best inter-
est of the child to be raised by her father so she would not be sub-
jected to racial prejudice.178 Upon review, the Supreme Court deter-
mined the deciding factor must be the child's welfare.179 Given this
standard, the Supreme Court found that the potential that the child
173 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1044 (3d ed. 2006) ("The Court broadly defined the term "liberty" in the due process clause
to protect basic aspects of family autonomy. The Court said: "Without doubt, [liberty] de-
notes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to con-
tract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to worship G-d according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
174 Id. (quoting Lacher v. Venus, 188 N.W. 613. 617 (Wis. 1922)).
1 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 56, 66 (2000) ("In light of this extensive precedent. it
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of their children."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (stating "the history and
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture
and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246. 255 (1978) (stating "we have recognized on numerous occasions that
the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected").
76 See Quilloin v. Walcott. 434 U.S. 246. 255 (1978) (stating "we have little doubt that ...
the Due Process Clause would be offended 'i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup
of a natural family over the objections of the parents and their children, without some show-
ing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best
interest" (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977))).
177 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430 (1984).
178 Id. at 431.
SId. at 432.
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would suffer prejudice did not justify removing an infant child from
the custody of its natural mother. 180 Palmore affirms a parent's right
to raise her child, and it is in the child's best interest to be raised by
both his natural parents when possible. 18 Though the Supreme Court
has not recognized the right of a child to be raised by his parents in
the same way it has recognized the right of a parent to raise her child,
there is a logical correlation between the two rights.
The courts in Oforji and Coleman suggest that the citizen
children of deported parents can retain their right to stay in the U.S.
by seeking guardians other than their parents. In doing so, they ig-
nore a century's worth of legal decisions adhering to the principle
that children are best served when in the custody of their parents.
D. Right of a Citizen Child to Legally Reside in the United States
The second fundamental flaw in the Coleman court's reason-
ing is its conception of de facto deportation.182 The Court fails to
adequately analyze what de facto deportation means. De facto is de-
fined as, "actual; existing in fact; having effect even though not for-
mally or legally recognized."183 Deportation is defined as "the act or
an instance of removing a person to another country."184 Therefore,
de facto deportation means that a person suffers deportation as a
practical consequence, even if this is not legally recognized as depor-
tation. This is a precise description of Saul's dilemma.
A minor child is dependent upon a parent or legal guardian. 185
This is particularly true of immigration law.186 Under immigration
law, a child is an "unmarried person under twenty-one years of age"
who falls into one of six categories based on his relationship to his
parent. 187 A child is dependent upon a parent to the extent that the
child does not exist outside of this relationship in immigration law. 188
Therefore, to deport the parent is to deport the child, even if the
child's name does not appear on the deportation order. For example,
sO ld. at 434.
... See Palmore. 466 U.S. at 433.
182 See Coleman, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 767-68.
. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009).
184 Id. at 504.
185 Id.
186 David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's Rights
Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 991 (2002).
187 Id. at 991(explaining 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(1)(A)-(F) (2000).)
1ss Id.
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because the deportation of an immigrant parent has the effect of re-
moving the child, the deportation of Arellano constitutes a de facto
deportation of Saul.
Though the court in Coleman held Saul's dilemma did not
constitute de facto deportation, it failed to establish what would.189 In
Salameda, the court found that de facto deportation occurred when a
child would be forced to leave the country where he had been raised
to accompany his parents to live in a country where he had never
been. 190 The extreme hardship on the exiled child was a sufficient
basis for vacating the removal order. 191 Saul faced a similar hardship.
He has lived his entire life in the United States but to remain with his
mother, he would be forced to leave his home to live in a country
where he has never been.192 Saul would suffer extreme hardship be-
cause of de facto deportation, sufficient to vacate the removal order
based on Salameda.193 However, Salameda is not applicable because
Saul is a United States citizen and therefore has the option of remain-
ing in the United States after his mother is deported. 194
The Coleman court's assertion that Saul may legally reside in
the United States assumes that Saul has the agency to choose whether
he will live in the United States or in Mexico.195 It fails to recognize
that Saul is a minor child who is legally and practically dependent
upon his mother. The same court could and would not recognize his
right to exercise other constitutional privileges, because he is a minor.
As a minor child, Saul cannot participate in the political process
through voting, 196 enter into the military to serve his country, 197 or le-
gally sign a contract. 198 There are legal and practical limitations to a
minor child's rights of citizenship. Yet, despite centuries of legal
tradition, the court in Coleman contends that a minor child has the le-
gal ability to sever his relationship with his mother and choose the
country where he would like to reside.199 Even if this contention is a
technically accurate representation of the law, it is not a realistic as-
189 Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
190 Salameda v. I.N.S., 70 F.3d 447, 449-451 (7th Cir. 1995).
19' Id. at 452.
192 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
193 Salameda. 70 F.3d at 452.
194 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
195 Id. at 766.
196 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
197 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2006).
198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
'99 Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
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sessment of the capacity of an eight-year-old child; nor is it consis-
tent with the level of responsibility given to children in other spheres
of U.S. law.
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE NEW SANCTUARY MOVEMENT AND DE FACTO
DEPORTATION
While claims of de facto deportation advanced by the NSM
are legally sound, it is unlikely courts will overrule precedent and
recognize them as valid. The current political climate has focused on
federal enforcement of current immigration laws and the creation of
harsher laws in the states, 200 making it more likely that the NSM will
be prosecuted for their methods and that de facto deportation claims
will continue to be denied.201 Though legislation could provide judi-
cial discretion to affirm claims of de facto deportation, such efforts
have been unsuccessful.202 Instead, legislation attacking the citizen-
ship of children of illegal immigrants has been gaining ground and
threatening to make such claims moot.20 3 These current political
trends make it unlikely that the NSM and the claims of de facto de-
portation it has advanced will be successful in the future.
A. Enforcement Immigration Laws and Legislation Targeting Illegal
Immigrants Make the Success of the NSM and Claims of De Facto
Deportation Unlikely
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, a new focus
on restricting illegal immigration and protecting American borders
emerged.204 As the federal government has been prosecuting illegal
aliens at an increasing rate, 205 the Obama administration has primarily
prosecuted illegal immigrants rather than those who have harbored
them.206 From October 2009 to February 2010, the Obama adminis-
200 David Nowicki, Arizona Immigration Law Ripples through History, U.S. Politics, THE
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 25, 2010, available at
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/20120/07/25 /20100725immigration-
law-history-politics.html.
201 Wild, supra note 5 at 999-1000.
202 Colvin, supra note 119, at 230.
203 Id. at 245.
204 Villazor, supra note 11, at 143.
205 Id
206 Patrick Oslo, Obama Increases Prosecutions of Illegal Immigrants while Decreasing
Prosecution of Other Crimes, LA PRENSA SAN DIEGO. (Feb. 19, 2010) http:/laprensa-
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tration prosecuted 67,994 illegal immigrants for non-violent, impro-
per entry into the United States.207 During this time, it conducted on-
ly 2,980 prosecutions for bringing in and harboring illegal immi-
grants, 106 prosecutions for aiding and abetting an illegal entry, and
13 prosecutions for employing unauthorized workers.208 This admin-
istration has focused on the prosecution and deportation of illegal
immigrants rather than the prosecution of those who harbor them. 209
The Obama administration's increased prosecution of illegal
immigrants could lead to the eventual prosecution of those who pro-
vide sanctuary to illegal immigrants like members of the NSM.210
Under the Bush administration in 2007, there were 185,944 deporta-
tions, while under the Obama administration in 2009 there were
387,790 deportations.211 If the Obama administration continues to in-
crease the prosecution of illegal immigrants, it is more likely it will
also increase the prosecution of those who assist them.
As the federal government has increased its prosecution of illegal
immigrants, state governments have been developing tougher immi-
gration enforcement laws.212 The most well known example is Ari-
zona SB 1070,passed in 2010.213 This law requires police officers to
inquire about a person's immigration status during a lawful stop, de-
tention, or arrest if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person
might be an illegal immigrant.214 It is the conceptual opposite of non-
cooperation public sanctuary laws but it was passed for the same pur-
pose of public safety.215 Those who support the bill claim it is neces-
sary to protect Arizona citizens from violence and crimes committed
by illegal immigrants.216
The toughening of immigration laws poses several potential
consequences for the NSM and de facto claims of deportation. First,
it becomes more likely that members of the NSM could be prosecut-
sandiego.org/editorial-and-commentary/commentary/obama-increases-prosecutions-of-
illegal-immigrants-while-decreasing-prosecution-of-other-crimes/.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 id.
210 id.
211 Garance Burke, Federal Prosecutions ofImmigrants Soar: Obama Continues Enforce-
ment Tactic Championed under Bush, ASSOCIATED PRESS. (July 15. 2010)
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38272361/.
212 Id.
213 Nowicki, supra note 200. See 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws Chapter 113.
214 ARIZ. S.B. 1070 59th §2-3 (2010).
215 Nowicki, supra note 200.
216 id.
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ed. Though the NSM claims its legal defenses will prevent prosecu-
tion of its members, this article has already established that those de-
fenses are insufficient. It becomes a question of when rather than if
the government will prosecute members of the NSM for harboring il-
legal aliens. Second, legal and political trends toward deportation of
illegal immigrants make it less likely that courts would consider over-
turning precedent and allow claims of de facto deportation to nullify
removal orders again alien parents with citizen children.
B. The Current Political Climate Makes Legislation in Support of De Facto
Deportation Claims Unlikely
Because established legal precedent rejects the claims,217 leg-
islation may be necessarily to allow courts to recognize claims of de
facto deportation. Congressional Representatives have repeatedly in-
troduced legislation to allow judges the discretion to nullify the de-
portation order of an illegal immigrant in the interests of her child
who is a United States citizen.218 However, the political focus on
preventing public sanctuaries along with the increase in prosecutions
and deportations of illegal immigrants makes it less likely that such
legislation would successfully pass. In 2006, H.R. 5035 was intro-
duced to "provide discretionary authority to an immigration judge to
determine that an alien parent of a United States citizen child should
not be ordered removed from the United States."219 This bill was also
referred to a committee and no action was ever taken.220 In 2007,
H.R. 1176 was introduced to "provide discretionary authority to an
immigration judge to determine that an alien parent of a United States
citizen child should not be ordered removed, deported, or excluded
from the United States."221 This legislation would have provided
courts with the discretionary power to recognize de facto deportation
claims. This bill was referred to three committees and no action was
ever taken. 222
Legislation has also been introduced to intervene in specific
217 Colvin, supra note 119. at 220.
218 H.R. 5035, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006): H.R. 1176, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
219 H.R. 5035: 109th Congress: To Provide Discretionary Authority..., GovTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpdbill=hl09-5035 (last visited Nov.7, 2010).
220 Id.
221 H.R. 1176: 110th Congress: To Provide Discretionary Authority..., GovTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill-hi 10-1176 (last visited Nov. 7. 2010).
222 id.
SANCTUARY FROM DE FACTO DEPORTATION
cases of de facto deportation.223 In 2007, H.R. 2182 was introduced
to provide Elvira Arellano and thirty-three other individuals with le-
gal immigrant status and the possibility of applying for permanent
residence status, but it never made it out of committee.224 Two years
later, a similar bill was introduced to benefit Arellano and thirty-nine
other individuals, but it also never made it out of the committee.225
As legislation aimed at supporting claims of de facto deporta-
tion has failed, legislation that would make them irrelevant is gaining
ground. States have been developing legislation that would prevent
the children of illegal aliens from gaining United States citizenship.226
State legislatures in Arizona and forty other states are considering
proposals that would refuse to grant citizenship to children born in
the United States if their parents are illegal immigrants.227 The Four-
teenth Amendment provides in part that "All persons born or natura-
lized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."228
This provision grants "birthright" citizenship to children born in the
United States, even if the child's parents are not in the United States
legally.229 In Arizona, the new legislation would create a special
class of birth certificates for children born to parents who cannot
prove their United States citizenship.230 If children like Saul Arella-
no- born in the United States to immigrant parents-are denied
birthright citizenship, then these new claims of de facto deportation
cannot be brought because the children will not have standing to
bring them or constitutional interests to protect. These new claims of
de facto deportation brought by the NSM will become irrelevant.
Whether the legislation passes or would survive a constitutional chal-
lenge in court is uncertain. Arizona's bill to take away birthright citi-
zenship231 and the similar measures being considered in most states
223 H.R. 250, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 182, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
224 H.R. 2182: 110th Congress: For the Relief of Elvira Arellano..., GovTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill-hi 10-2182 (last visited Nov. 7. 2010).
225 H.R. 2645: 111th Congress: For the ReliefofElviraArellano..., GovTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill-hi 11-2645 (last visited Nov. 7. 2010).
226 S.J. Res. 131. (VA. 2008): H. Res. 30, (MI. 2011): S.J. Res. 15, 213th Leg.. (NJ. 2008).
227 Michael Martinez, Arizona Legislators Consider Birthright Citizenship Bill, CNN.Com,
Feb. 7, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011 US/02/07/arizona.citizenship/index.html.
228 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
229 Id.; see also Martinez supra note 227.
230 See Martinez. supra note 227.
231 id.
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prove that legislation drafted to protect the constitutional rights of cit-
izen children will not be successful in the current political climate.
As legislation to provide discretionary authority for courts to
recognize claims of de facto deportation continues to fall and new
legislation that would undermine those claims continues to rise, de
facto deportation claims will not be successful in nullifying the re-
moval orders of illegal immigrant parents with citizen children.
VII. CONCLUSION
The NSM developed an innovative legal strategy in claims of
de facto deportation for citizen children of illegal immigrants. 232
Though Saul Arellano's claim was unsuccessful in court, it presented
valid legal and practical grounds for a child to nullify his parent's de-
portation order and defended the rights of a citizen child to reside in
the United States and be raised by his parent whenever possible.233
Unfortunately, the current political climate has made it unlikely that
the NSM and claims of de facto deportation will be successful in the
near future. As the Sanctuary Movement members were prosecuted
in the past, 234 it has become more likely the same will happen to the
current and future members of the NSM. And though the NSM has
asserted its methods are legal, it is entirely possible for a court to
convict members of harboring illegal aliens. Furthermore, though
claims of de facto deportation often meet the necessary requirements
for adjudication and assert rights of a child grounded in moral and le-
gal principles, the current political climate has undermined legislative
attempts to advance those claims and brought new legislative attacks.
Given the state of current law, courts should grant claims of de facto
deportation brought by the NSM on behalf of citizen children to nul-
lify their parents' removal orders. Regrettably, current legal and po-
litical trends make such recognition improbable.
232 See Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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234 See generally, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Ariz.
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